John H. Carmichael, Esq. (196416)
Law Offices of John H. Carmichael
269 South Beverly Drive, Suite 395
Beverly Hills, California 90212
P: (310) 367-5432
F: (310) 358-2719
Attorney for Plaintiff,
Harlan Ellison
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
HARLAN ELLISON,
an individual, Plaintiff, vs. FANTAGRAPHICS,
INC., a corporation; GARY GROTH, an individual; KIM THOMPSON, an individual;
and DOES 1 THROUGH 20, inclusive, Defendants. _______________________________ |
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CASE NO.
CV-06-6532 ABC (FFMx) Assigned to the
Hon. Audrey B. Collins PLAINTIFF HARLAN
ELLISONS OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PER C.C.P.
SECTION 425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP MOTION) DECLARATIONS OF
PAT LYONS, HARLAN ELLISON, CHARLES E. PETIT, AND ACCOMPANYING EXHIBITS Submitted: December 11, 2006 Hearing: February 12, 2007 Time: 10:00 a.m. |
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I. INTRODUCTION
Harlan Ellison, the Plaintiff
in this case, happens to be an author with a history of championing First
Amendment rights, winning the PEN award
in 1990 for Continuing Commitment to Artistic Freedom and the Battle Against
Censorship and in 1998 receiving the the Defender of Liberty Award from the
Comic Book Legal Defense Fund in recognition of a fifty-year history promoting free
speech.
It is therefore at least
curious and at most distressing that Ellison would be compelled to bring legal
action to correct false statements of
fact about his alleged dishonesty and quasi-criminal behavior in connection
with a decades old defamation case the Fleisher matter in which Ellison sought and obtained First Amendment protection for an
interview that appeared in Defendants periodical, The Comics Journal.
There is a maddening
circularity to this turn of events which Plaintiff readily acknowledges, but
cannot escape from so long as the Defendants do not recognize the difference
between non-actionable opinion and false statements of fact. Indeed, Ellison
has tolerated insult, sharp opinion, invective and hyperbole from these
Defendants over a 20 year period. Defendants even formed a hate group called
the Enemies of Ellison and attempted to sell memberships. They printed
pamphlets fomenting dislike and revilement
of all things related to Ellison. He did not sue them. He did, however,
have a heart attack and quadruple bypass during the period of that groups peak activity. In response Ellison may have expressed
some non-actionable
opinion of his own regarding
Defendants campaign against
him during this lengthy feud.
But this year, Defendants
upped the ante dramatically by using Ellisons name to sell a new book of theirs about comics without Ellisons authorization or knowledge
(referring to Ellison pejoratively on the cover as a Famous Comics Dilletante) thus
trading on his name while diminishing him and including an interview Ellison
never authorized to be published in book form or truncated fashion, and for
which use he was never separately compensated.
Then,
Defendants promoted and partially published (for promotional purposes) another book containing false and
defamatory statements of fact about Ellison related to the Fleisher matter. He
wrote to them in July 2006 and tried to come to some understanding, but was
rebuffed in reckless fashion as set forth below.
Finally, in September
2006 at the end of his preferred
options with Defendants Ellison sued them in California state
court for defamation and statutory misappropriation of his rights to control
the use of his name and likeness. Defendants removed the action to this Honorable
Court on diversity grounds, and Plaintiff hereby vigorously opposes Defendants overexpansive and specious anti-SLAPP motion.
II. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. The General Scope of the anti-SLAPP Statute
As this Court recently
confirmed, the statutory scheme set forth at California Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute) was enacted
in response to the California legislatures concern about civil actions aimed at private citizens to deter or
punish them for exercising their political or legal rights. See Thomas
v. Los Angeles Times Communications, LLC, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (C.D. Cal.
2002), cert. den. 537 U.S. 1172. The statute grew out of the concern that large
private interest plaintiffs (such as real estate developers) were using
meritless tort actions to deter or punish individual activists who opposed
their views. Metcalf v. U-Haul Intern., Inc., 118 Cal. App. 4th
1261 (2004). Thus, the statutes purpose is to curb meritless lawsuits, not to prohibit bona fide
claims. M.G. v.
Time Warner, Inc., 89 Cal. App. 4th 623 (2001).
As the Court is well aware, the meritless actions contemplated by C.C.P.
section 425.16 are known as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation or SLAPP suits.
This is not one of them.
Instead, this is a
defamation action based on misstatements or distortions of fact by Defendants with
a long history of demonstrated antipathy and outright malice toward this
particular Plaintiff, and an
accompanying misappropriation claim for flagrant, taunting, unauthorized use of
Plaintiffs name under
Californias right of publicity statute.
Assuming a defendant can
meet its initial burden to show that the statute applies, the evidentiary standard
plaintiff must then meet to survive an anti-SLAPP motion is low: the case must
lack even minimal merit. Siam v.
Kizilbash, 130 Cal. App. 4th 1563 (2005); see also
Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc., 120 Cal. App. 4th 90
(2004).
As a California
appellate panel recently made clear, an anti-SLAPP motion is not a vehicle for testing the strength
of a plaintiffs case, or the
ability of a plaintiff, so early in the proceedings, to produce evidence
supporting each theory of damages asserted in connection with the plaintiffs claims; it is a vehicle for determining whether a
plaintiff, through a showing of minimal merit, has stated and substantiated a
legally sufficient claim. Wilbanks v. Wolk, 121 Cal. App. 4th
883 (2004).
The burden of plaintiff
who has brought suit subject to dismissal under an anti-SLAPP statute is much
like that used in determining a motion for nonsuit or directed
verdict, which mandates dismissal when no reasonable jury could find for
the plaintiff. Metabolife Intern., Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F. 3d 832
(2001).
An anti-SLAPP motion is
not a substitute for a summary judgment motion. Lam v. Ngo, 91 Cal. App.
4th 832 (2001). In reviewing a motion to strike pursuant to the
anti-
SLAPP statute, the court cannot weigh the evidence, but instead
must simply determine whether the respective partys evidence is sufficient to meet its burden of
proof. Padres L.P. v. Henderson, 114 Cal. App. 4th 495 (2003);
see also Fleishman v.
Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 4th
350 (2002) (court must not compare
probative strength of competing evidence or decide disputed questions of fact). To weigh the evidence at this stage of the proceedings would violate
plaintiffs right to a jury
trial. Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 4th
1551 (2003).
A trial court must
accept as true all of the evidence favorable to the plaintiff. Nagel v.
Twin Laboratories, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 4th
39 (2003) (cause of action is subject to motion to strike if it lacks even
minimal merit); see also Walker v. Kiousis, 93 Cal. App. 4th
1432 (2001). Any ambiguity in the anti-SLAPP statute must be resolved in favor
of a resolution on the merits. Decker v. U.D. Registry, Inc., 105 Cal.
App. 4th 1382 (2003).
B. Contrary to Defendants Position That the anti-SLAPP
Statute Has Nearly Unlimited
Application, the Statute and Interpretive Case Law Impose Several Important Limitations Which Operate as
a Bar to Defendants Motion.
The
statute itself and an ever burgeoning body of common law work to impose important
limitations on the scope and applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute generally
and as to the instant case. These limitations will be discussed seriatum.
(Continued)
1. The Matters at Issue in Plaintiffs Complaint Are Not
Matters of Public Interest Within the Special
Meaning of the Anti-SLAPP Statute,
and Thus Plaintiffs Complaint is not Properly Subject to Defendants Motion to Strike.
One must remember the
origins of the anti-SLAPP statute and work outward in
order to properly address the threshold inquiry of whether a particular
matter at issue in a
complaint or cause of action is, in fact, a matter of public interest.
In determining whether
to grant a special motion to strike suit under the anti-SLAPP
statute, a court must first determine whether plaintiffs causes of action arose from acts by defendants in
furtherance of defendants rights of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. Seelig
v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 97 Cal. App. 4th 798 (2002). Put
another way, an anti-SLAPP motion must be denied if the trial court determines
the cause of action did not arise from an act taken by the defendant in
furtherance of the defendants right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. Santa
Monica Rent Control Bd. v. Pearl Street, 109 Cal. App. 4th
(2003).
Neither public interest nor public issue is specifically defined under the anti-SLAPP
statute. The contours of the definitions are left to the courts. In this
regard, a recent
ruling from the Central District construing the statute stated that an
issue is public for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute if it
impacts a broad segment of society or affects the community in a manner similar
to that of a governmental agency. Troy Group v. Tilson, 364 F. Supp. 2d
1149 (2005) (case considered the question of whether an email correspondence
about a plaintiff constituted a matter of public interest or not).
On this point, Defendants
inappropriately strain their interpretation of the holding of Sipple v.
Foundation for National Progress, 71 Cal. App. 4th 226 (1999),
by claiming it stands for the sweeping proposition that where statements at issue are related to litigation the moving parties need not separately show these
statements concern an issue of public interest. It appears, however, that Sipple is limited to the facts of that
case, and
holds: Hence, the article,
insofar as it discusses the statements
made during deposition or at the hearing at the custody trial, falls within
the ambit of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1), and respondents need not
separately show that these statements concern an issue of public interest. Sipple at 238.
Also, it appears
necessary to the holding in Sipple that
the issue of wife beating
which was the subject of the article in question was an important issue in society. Id. The same cannot be said of whether Harlan
Ellison wheedled out of his legal bills, enacted schemes to avoid paying them, refused
to reimburse another party for their costs, or
screwed defendant Groth financially in a twenty-five year old, long resolved
lawsuit. And in the case of Plaintiffs misappropriation claim under California Civil Code section 3344, it
is an interview that Ellison never granted Defendants the right to
publish in this format.
The statements by a publisher
of an advertisement in a token collecting newsletter, stating that token
collector had stolen a valuable collectors item from the publisher, was held not involve a matter of public interest, and thus, token collectors suit against publisher alleging claims of libel, slander, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress was not subject to dismissal under
anti-SLAPP statute. Weinberg v. Feisel, 110 Cal. App. 4th
1122 (2003).
In another recent case,
the statements by a labor union in documents distributed to
its members concerning the
alleged theft, extortion, nepotism, acceptance of bribes, and abusive treatment
by a supervisor of eight janitors at a state university was not held to relate to a public issue, and thus the supervisors complaint against the union alleging libel and other causes of action
was not subject to dismissal under anti-SLAPP statute. Rivero v. American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 105
Cal. App. 4th 913 (2003).
To satisfy the public
issue requirement of provisions of anti-SLAPP statute in cases where an issue
is not of interest to the public at large, but rather only to a limited but
definable portion of the public, such as private group, organization or
community, the statements or conduct must, at a minimum, occur in the context
of an ongoing controversy,
dispute, or discussion, such that it warrants protection by the statute
that embodies the public policy of encouraging participation in matters of
public significiance. Du Charme v.
International Broth. of Elec. Workers, Local 45, 110 Cal. App. 4th 107 (2003).
Similarly, the
anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to the instant case at all because obscure alleged
out-of-court conduct by a party from a twenty-year old court case should not be
deemed matters of public interest for purposes of the statute, and neither should a
claim of misappropriation of publicity rights under California Civil Code
section 3344.
2.
An Anti-SLAPP Motion is Only Proper Against an Entire Complaint, or an Entire Cause Of
Action; The Court Does Not Need
to Parse Entire Cause of Action If it Finds That Any of the Specific
Allegations Within That Cause of Action are Valid.
If a defendant who
brings a special motion to strike demostrates that plaintiffs claim arose from constitutionally protected
activity within the ambit of the statute, the plaintiff
need only demonstrate a probability of prevailing on any part of a claim. Once the plaintiff
makes this showing, the trial court need not engage in the time-consuming
task of determining whether the plaintiff can substantiate all theories
presented within a single cause of action and need not parse the cause of
action so as to leave only those portions it
has determined have merit. Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc.,
120 Cal. App. 4th 90
(2004); see also,
M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 89 Cal. App. 4th 623 (2001).
This is important
because to the extent Plaintiff can show any dispute of fact or the minimal merit mentioned above regarding any part of the defamation claim or the
misappropriation claim, the entire cause of action must remain and thus survive
the anti-SLAPP motion.
C.
Plaintiff Brought the Action Against Defendants to Properly Protect His
Repuation from Untruthful
Statements of Fact by Defendants About Plaintiff With History of Malice Toward Plaintiff, and Not to Chill Free Speech Rights
of Defendants.
Defendants
place in controversy the question of Plaintiffs motivations in filing this lawsuit. While it appears that recent
California Supreme Court decisions have nullified this requirement, some
subsequent cases suggest that a plaintiffs intent may be relevant. In either case, because Defendants put the
question of Plaintiffs motivations for filing the suit at issue, Plaintiffs will rebut the claim of improper motive on its
face.
The hallmark of a SLAPP suit is that it lacks merit, and is brought with the goals of obtaining an
economic advantage over a citizen party by increasing the cost of litigation to
the point that the citizen partys case will be weakened or abandoned, and of deterring future litigation.
U.S. ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 190 F.
3d 963, cert. den. 530 U.S. 1203 (1999).
Here, the Plaintiff took
a deliberate and measured decision to proceed, after having the following
exchange of letter and phone call with Defendants, as set forth in the
Declaration of Charles E. Petit, counsel to Plaintiff:
In light of the ...
nature of the statements in the online publication, I sent a letter ... to
Defendants [on Ellisons behalf].
On 27 July 2006, I
received a telephone call from Kenneth Norwick, identifying himself as
defendants counsel. ... The
conversation lasted approximately fifteen minutes. Norwick stated that: (a) Mr.
Ellison is a public figure for all purposes, and therefore has no right or
ability to control or object
to defendants statements about
him. (b)The statements on pages 118 and 119 of the online publication are based
on the best of [Groths] recollection of a twenty-year-old case, and that Groths responsibility to investigate or otherwise confirm factual statements
required him to do no more than rely upon his memory of legal technicalities even though Groth is not a lawyer. Norwick
specified the motion slightly more specifically, claiming that it had
something to do with Mr. Ellison agreeing to pay Fleishers attorneys fees if Mr. Ellison was brought back into the suit. I requested that Norwick, in the interest of keeping the dispute from
escalating, provide further details and documentation consistent with his
statements and with the statements in the publication. However, Norwick
explicitly refused to provide any documentation of those statements, claiming
that it is [Ellisons] burden to prove falsity.
(c) Norwick threatened that if Mr. Ellison attempted to take any further
action regarding the statements in the publication, whether by lawsuit or
otherwise, that he (Norwick) would cause plenty of damage to Mr. Ellisons First Amendment reputation, especially if Mr. Ellison attempted to get a prepublication injunction against a book. When I pointed out that the work had already been
published by placing it online, Norwick abruptly refused to
discuss that aspect of the matter further and changed the subject.
Petit Declaration ΆΆ 6, 7.
As expressed by the
Plaintiff:
Mr. Groth also suggests that my hyperbolic analogy
describing taking legal action against him to whomp him upside the head
which was made casually in an internet forum is evidence of an improper
motive on my part. There are many other clichιs I could think of to describe
this action against the Defendants including, without limitation, putting my
foot down, or drawing the line. The
fact of the matter is I wrote to the Defendants; I asked nicely if firmly, that
they reconsider publishing this false and defamatory material, and stop trading
on my name without authorization. I did not want it to come to this.
But
since it did, I see nothing improper in seeking legal redress in the form of an
injunction, damages, or both. If that constitutes whomping Defendants upside
the head, then so be it. I would prefer not to be in this circumstance at all
and tried to avoid it with my earlier correspondence. I certainly did not
expect them to make a federal case out of it, but here we are. I would hope the
Court can see that I am not trying to chill the exercise
of Defendants First Amendment rights or any other
rights. Instead, I am simply trying to correct the record of my participation
in the Fleisher lawsuit and to prevent the further unauthorized use and marring
of my name on Fantagraphics publications, their products.
Given the history
between the parties, it would seem not unreasonable to assert that Defendants
were goading Plaintiff into filing just this sort of lawsuit by failing to
address his reasonable and narrowly tailored objections to misstatements of
fact, and the unauthorized and uncompensated use of his name.
D. The Defamation Claim Must Survive
Defendants Motion.
1. Defendants Remarks Were False
Statements of Fact and Have a Plainly Defamatory Meaning.
Defendants
engage in an impermissible and gamesman-like parsing of the allegedly
defamatory remarks. Their strategy seems to be to break the statements down
into their smallest constitutent parts, so that any tiny portion robbed of its context has no
defamatory effect at all. Courts have roundly rejected this approach. Whether
or not a challenged statement is fairly susceptible of a defamatory meaning is
a question of law.
Dodds v. ABC, Inc., 145 F. 3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir.1998),
and the determination should be made "from the standpoint of the average
reader, judging the statement not in isolation, but within the context in which
it is made." Norse v. Henry
Holt & Co., 991 F.2d 563, 567
(9th Cir.1993); see also Franklin v. Dynamic Details,
Inc., 116 Cal. App. 4th 375, 389, (2004) (Courts look at the nature and
full content of the communication and to the knowledge and understanding of the
audience to whom the publication is directed).
As the Court well knows, the First Amendment
protects from liability "statements that cannot 'reasonably [be]
interpreted as stating actual facts' about an individual." Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) quoting Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46 (1988); see also Gregory v. McDonnell,
17 Cal. 3d 596, 600-01 (1976) ("An essential element of libel ... is that
the publication in question must contain a false statement of fact.")
Accordingly, statements of opinion are protected by the First Amendment unless
they "imply a false assertion of fact." Milkovich, 497 U.S. at
19.
As a recent illustration
of non-actionable opinion and overly vague statements, a television show
participant failed to establish a probability that she would have prevailed on
her claims of slander, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress asserted against broadcast corporation after radio program
made derogatory comments about participant that included references to
participant as chicken butt, local loser, and a big skank, and thus corporation was entitled to special motion to strike suit. The
comments local loser and chicken butt were not
actionable because they were unquestionably statements of speakers subjective judgment and fell into the realm of
classic rhetorical hyperbole which could not reasonably interpreted as stating
actual facts, and phrase big skank was not actionable
because it was too vague to be capable of being proven true or false. Seelig
v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 97 Cal. App. 4th 798 (2002); see
also, ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993 (2001).
Conversely, in a recent
ruling denying a defendants anti-SLAPP motion, a California appellate panel stated that a
reasonable jury could find that a former beneficiary of a decedents trust who said the trustee of that trust came to help himself meaning he was
there to milk the trust for whatever he could get was defamatory,
and not merely a statement of opinion or a mere insult. Gallagher v. Connell,
123 Cal. App. 4th 1260
(2004).
To decide whether a statement is
fact or opinion, a court must put itself in the place of an average reader and
determine the natural and probable effect of the
statement,
considering both the language and the context. Hofmann Co. v. E. I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 202 Cal. App. 3d 390, 397-98 (2001).
In this case, it should
be plain that Defendants made statements of fact, not mere opinion, insult or
hyperbole:
Being a co-defendant with Ellison made me
feel like I was in the Alamo: surrounded on all sides. It is little known that
our relationship began to fray very early on. He was always coming up with schemes to wheedle out of paying his
bills. One was so brilliantly Machievelian [sic] that it included both stiffing
his lawyers and screwing me at the same time! You just never knew what he was going to come up with next, which
meant we had to watch our co-defendant
as closely as we watched Fleisher. (emphasis added).
The
true facts are that Ellison was scrupulous in his payment of attorneys fees and
other costs. Defendants claims that Ellison stiffed his lawyers, screwed
his co-defendant, or wheedled out of any financial responsibility in connection
with the case are not true or grossly mischaracterized. Because of space limitations,
Plaintiff respectfully refers the Court to paragraphs 15 through 24 and
Exhibits C through K of Plaintiffs declaration for evidentiary support of this
position, as well as to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Lyons Declaration.
The other
statement at issue reads:
One
of my favorite stories involves Ellison
cutting a deal that required him to reimburse Fleisher if he lost a
particular motion. The judge approved
the arrangement and Ellison lost the motion but refused to reimburse Fleishers out of pocket expenses, as
agreed. Our lawyer started to realize what a loose
canon he was when we learned that the
judge was about to order U.S. Marshals to arrest Ellison for failing to
obey a court
order. Naturally, Ellison coughed it up but only days before he was about to be arrested. (emphasis added.)
The anti-SLAPP statute does not even apply to defamation actions based on false
allegations of criminal conduct not made to law enforcement. Weinberg v.
Feisel, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1122 (2003). It is well known that
contempt of court is quasi-criminal in nature, even if it arises from conduct
in a civil case. See e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 12 Cal. 4th
804 (1996). It is also well known that inability
to comply with a court order is a valid defense in a contempt proceeding. See
e.g., In re Cassil, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1081 (1995).
Ellison arranged for
payment of the reimbursement before he would have presented an inability to comply defense at the hearing on contempt and never would have let it get that
far in any case. Thus, both the statement that Ellison blithely refused to comply with a court order, and
that he was subject to arrest without further process implying that he had been adjudicated as in
contempt are false.
Moreover, they paint a completely inaccurate picture of the dire straits all
defendants there found themselves in at that point. In particular, Ellison, who
was commencing feverish efforts to find coverage for his defense and borrowing
money to pay fees and costs as they came due, was not in a position to cut deals with the other side or sit back and refuse to obey court
orders. See Ellison
Declaration at ΆΆ 25-27, and accompanying exhibits L and M.
If Ellison did not pay for Fleishers reimbursement, it was because he was unable to comply and entitled to
offer a legal excuse and seek a modification of the terms of the reimbursement
order, and this was well known to Groth. In fact, Groths own declaration and evidence contradicts his
statements in the offending publication. Groth acknowledges in his declaration
that Ellison could not pay and the lawyers elected to advance the cost of the
reimbursement. This is at odds even with his own defamatory statement that
Ellison was simply refusing to pay and only decided capriciously to cough it up days before he was about to be arrested.
Groth knows there was
nothing to cough up and no voluntary refusal on Ellisons part, but he tells the story as to make Ellison
look dishonest, clownish, and at least quasi criminal. Groths statement misrepresents the reason for the initial
non-payment, the resolution of it, and the nature of Ellisons relationship to the Court at that moment in time.
The truth is Ellison was
scrambling to find money to defend the case and pay other costs, such as Fleishers reimbursement, while Fantagraphics was inflaming
the situation as described by Pat Lyons:
In addition, Groth states that Groth had to watch
our co-defendant [Ellison] as closely as we watched [the plaintiff] Fleischer
nothing could be further from the truth. Groth, Thompson and Fantagraphics
continued
throughout the course of that litigation to hurl
insults and antagonistic public
statements the way of the plaintiff, Fleischer,
inflaming and excacerbating the
situation. I remember a judicial determination by the
late Judge Broderick that the continuing, antagonistic conduct of Groth,
Thompson and
Fantagraphics during the course of the litigation was
or would be enough to
substantiate a showing of malice. Thus, contrary to Groths mischaracterization of the
events, it was Ellison who provided stability and ultimately convincing
testimony to stave off a verdict for the plaintiff.
Lyons Declaration Ά 6.
2.
Plaintiff Can Show Actual Malice Here; But at Least One Federal Trial Court Decision Holds That
Such a Showing Should Not
be Necessary For Plaintiff to Survive an anti-SLAPP Motion.
Evidence of actual
malice, which exists when speaker entertained serious doubts as to truth of
statement, is uniquely within control of defamation suit defendant and,
therefore,
generally should not be tested on
motion to dismiss under Californias anti-SLAPP statute. Metabolife
Intern., Inc. v. Wornick, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (1999), affd in part, rev. in part,
264 F. 3d 832 (emphasis added).
Generally stated, under
California law, public figures must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
an allegedly defamatory statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or in
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity, a standard known as actual malice.
See Thomas v. Los Angeles Times Communications, LLC,
189 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (C.D. Cal. 2002), cert. den. 537 U.S.
1172.
The Plaintiff here is at
least a limited purpose public figure (which does not mean the matter is a
public issue under the anti-SLAPP statute, as discussed above) and probably a
public figure. Given the history of antipathy between the parties as set forth
at length in the declarations of both Groth and Ellison (although they differ
sharply over the reasons for said antipathy) and Defendants admissions of at least reckless disregard for truth
or falsity made through their authorized agent, Ken Norwick, that: [T]he statements .
. . are based on the best of [Groths] recollection of a twenty-year-old case, and that Groths responsibility to investigate or otherwise confirm factual statements
required him to do no more than rely upon his memory of legal technicalities even though Groth is not a lawyer, and threatening that if Mr. Ellison attempted to take any further action regarding the
statements in the publication, whether by lawsuit or otherwise, that he
(Norwick) would cause plenty of
damage to Mr. Ellisons First Amendment reputation, the Plaintiff can show actual malice. See Petit Declaration at ΆΆ 6-7.
Further, given the
prevalence of spelling and other grammatical errors in the text, which suggest
neither proofreading or vetting had been done, this is a case where the
Plaintiff can show by clear and convincing evidence the presence of actual
malice. Perhaps
this is a case where Plaintiff can not only show a reckless disregard for truth or falsity, but even knowledge of falsity. For example, Groth
went on at length under oath in his declaration explaining how Ellisons alleged failure to pay certain temporary local
counsel in New York alienated everybody and supported his position that this is
a strategic lawsuit against public participation.
However, Ellison
presents a letter from Groth during the same period wherein Groth revealed to
Ellison: On another front, I
have heard twice from the old law firm
in NYC whos trying to squeeze more money out of us; I
have put them off both times, and havent heard from Bob Eegan in two weeks. We seem to be low priority for which
I am thankful. Frankly, I resent paying them
more money for services Im unsure we
ever got. See Exhibit
G to the Declaration of Harlan Ellison (emphasis added).
In conflict with Groths self-serving account, Ellisons declaration testimony further elucidates the true
facts of that period:
For approximately the past 20 years, Mr. Groth has
taken every opportunity to take shots at me and worse, even co-founding an
organization called The
Enemies of Ellison, a hate group whose activities
are for the most part published record. For example, an article in the
periodical entitled Gauntlet from
1995 describes this group as engaging in a six month campaign to annoy Harlan
Ellison.
I
can assure the Court it was much more than mere annoyance. This small but
virulent group, of which Groth was a prime mover, wrote letters to editors of
publications I had written freelance reviews for, such as The Washington Post, and effectively caused the paper to stop
hiring me. They
sent letters
to Playboy, where I had been a
contributor prior to their conduct, and effectively terminated that
professional relationship.
Fortunately,
I had some friends, too, and they formed a competing group called Friends of
Ellison which helped. But around this time I suffered a heart attack,
resulting in a quadruple bypass, and still maintain that the organized
character assassination, perpetrated in large part by Groth, Thompson and
Fantagraphics, was a major contributing factor to my ill health.
I
finally sent them a cease and desist letter, but did not pursue litigation at
that time. It is difficult even now for me to pursue litigation on defamation
grounds because I have been recognized for my defense of First Amendment
Rights, including winning the PEN award in 1990 for Continuing
Commitment to Artistic Freedom and the Battle Against
Censorship; in 1998 I was the recipient of the coveted Defender of Liberty
Award of the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund for my fifty-year efforts promoting
free speech.
Yet,
knowing misstatements of fact, made intentionally to harm anothers reputation,
as described below, are not the sort of speech I have worked to protect.
As
the Gauntlet article noted in
relation to the Enemies of Ellison group and my 1995 cease and desist letter,
When we factor in the incessant
activities that Groth engaged in, when we tally those
activities in the aggregate, we begin to understand the temptation Ellison must
have felt to do something anything! to make this stop, to make this go
away. Indeed, I had hoped that it had gone away.
Unfortunately,
the unpleasant discovery of the unauthorized use of my name on the cover of a
2006 publication referring to me as a comics dilettante and the false
statements about my alleged misconduct in the Fleisher case, are forcing me
finally to take action against these Defendants who have tested and tested the
outer limits of First Amendment protection where I am concerned. I have done
what I can over the years to avoid a direct legal confrontation with Groth,
Thompson and Fantagraphics, even though I have found their activities
harmful. But this year, given their
unauthorized use of my name along with an insult on the cover of a book, and
the publication of misstatements of fact about the nature of my alleged
misconduct in the Fleisher case in yet another book, the Defendants have simply
gone too far. Thus, I am compelled to take steps to protect my
reputation by
correcting the published record of events in the Fleisher litigation and
curtailing the unauthorized use of my name.
Ellison Declaration at ΆΆ 8-12.
Based on all the
foregoing, Plaintiff though not necessarily required to do so under Metabolife Intern.,
Inc. v. Wornick, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (1999) can and does demonstrate clear and convincing evidence at this very
early stage of the proceeding that Groth had knowledge of the falsity of his
statements of fact or, at a minimum, reckless disregard for the truth or
falsity of those statements.
3. The Litigation Privilege is Inapplicable to
Defendants
Remarks Under the Language of the Statute.
The
qualified privilege afforded defendants who might otherwise be subject to
defamation actions for statements made concerning judicial proceedings does not
apply in this case. In relevant part, California Civil Code section 47(d) is
self-limiting to fair and accurate reports to a public journal of a judicial
proceeding. As demonstrated in the attached declarations and exhibits,
Defendants have not engaged in fair and accurate reporting of a judicial proceeding. And, in fact, the remarks directed
at Ellisons alleged failure
to pay legal bills and enact schemes for getting out of them at Groths expense, does not come within the ambit of the
statute at all, as those remarks are not reports of a judicial proceeding. See Cal. Civ. Code § 47(d).
(Continued)
E. The anti-SLAPP Statute Does Not Apply to
Plaintiffs Statutory Misappropriation Claims;
Defendants Broad Assertions
of Unconstitutionality are Without Adequate
Support.
Defendants
have cited no cases reflecting that a court has granted an anti-SLAPP motion
with respect to a statutory misappropriation claim under California Civil Code
section 3344. This is because it is inherently inappropriate to do so where, as
here, the claim intersects with a recognition by the California Legislature of
a property right, or quasi-property right, of the Plaintiff the substantive right to exclusively profit from
the use of their name and likeness for use on or in products. See Cal.
Civil Code § 3344.
All of the authority cited
by Defendants either (a) relates to a common law claim for
misappropriation of name and likeness and not the statutory variety relied upon by Plaintiff here, or (b) does
not stand for the stated proposition.
For example, Defendants
attempt to mislead the Court through their citation to Dora v. Frontline Video,
Inc., 15 Cal. App. 4th 526 (1993), claiming that case stands for
the proposition that California courts similarly have held that the public interest in the subject matter . . .
give[s] rise to a constitutional protection against liability in common law misappropriation claims. In reality,
the court there only exempted defendants from liability under section 3344 (d) having nothing to do with the quote in Defendants brief. That quote applies to a completely different
cause of action brought by the plaintiff in that case: private disclosure of
public facts. Thus Defendants citations cannot be trusted.
Plaintiff invites the
Court to consider the Jury Instructions drafted by the California Judicial
Council for use in an action brought under Civil Code section 3344:
1803 - Appropriation of Name or Likeness
[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] violated [his/her]
right to privacy. To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all
of the following:
1. That [name of defendant] used [name of plaintiff]'s name, likeness, or
identity without [his/her] permission;
2. That [name of defendant] gained
a commercial benefit [or some other advantage] by using [name of plaintiff]'s
name, likeness, or identity;
3. That [name of plaintiff] was harmed; [and]
4. That [name of defendant]'s conduct was a substantial factor in causing
[name of
plaintiff]'s harm; [and]
[5. That the privacy interests of
[name of plaintiff] outweigh the public interest served by [name of
defendant]'s use of [his/her] name, likeness, or identity.
In deciding whether [name of plaintiff]'s privacy interest outweighs the
public's interest, you should consider where the information was used, the
extent of the use, the public interest
served by the use, and the seriousness of the interference with [name of
plaintiff]'s privacy.]
1-1800 CACI 1803
Plaintiff should be
allowed to make his case on each of these elements to the jury, including the
last one. The Defendants have produced no evidence that Plaintiff consented to
the use of either the underlying interview in book form in 2006, or that he
authorized the use of his name in connection with this book. It is certainly
not allowed under the news and public affairs exception as urged by Defendants. Fantagraphics sells books about
comics. This is a classic example of one of their products. It is offered for sale, for
profit, and to court a general readership.
Perhaps the best one can
do in opposing a motion to strike claims under a statute for which there is applicable
precedent cited by the moving party is to argue by analogy to similar causes of
action that have been held outside the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute:
The list of ingredients
on dietary supplement manufacturers product labels and online site constituted commcercial speech only, and
thus was not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute in consumers action against manufacturer for unfair
competition, false advertising, and consumer protection violations; the list of
ingredients on the labels and online site was not participation in the public
dialogue on weight management issues, but
was designed to further manufacturers private interest of increasing sales for its products. Nagel v. Twin
Laboratories, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 4th 39 (2003).
The advertising of a manufacturers dietary supplements on its labels, and to the
public, for the purpose of selling that product, was not an issue of public
interest, as would subject consumers false advertising claim to special motion to strike under anti-SLAPP
statute. Scott v. Metabolife Intern., Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th
404 (2004).
Moreover, it is important to note that the Plaintiff did
not consent to either the use of the interview in book form, or the use of his
name in connection with the sale of such a book, and Defendants have produced
no evidence of such consent. According to Plaintiff:
As
admitted by Mr. Groth in his declaration, Fantagraphics released a book earlier
this year which, unbeknownst to me, featured my name on the cover, along with a
slur, referring to me as a Famous Comics Dilettante, thus denigrating and
dismissing my work in the genre that goes back to the 1960s.
When
I sat for the interview in question some 26 years ago, I never envisioned, nor
would I have authorized, inclusion of the interview in book
form. I was
told by Mr. Groth that the interview would be carried in his nascent Comics
Journal a periodical. Had he informed me that one of the intended uses of the
interview would be to include it in a for-profit book publication 26 years
after the fact, and that he would include my name on the cover of the book to
help sell it, and include an insult next to my name in
the process, I never would have agreed to it. I have
granted to the Defendants no right to use the interview in the form they have
most recently used it. The use of my name on the cover of the book is
unauthorized and
uncompensated.
Ellison Declaration at ΆΆ 28, 29.
For all of the reasons
stated in this section, therefore, the Court should not summarily dismiss this
important and well founded claim of Ellisons on the broad, vague claims of unconstitutionality by Defendants.
III. CONCLUSION
For all the
foregoing reasons, as well as those presented at the hearing of this matter, Plaintiff
opposes Defendants anti-SLAPP motion,
and respectfully requests that the Court deny the motion and allow the case to
proceed.
Respectfully submitted, Law Offices of John H.
Carmichael
DATE:
December 11, 2006 _____________________________
John H.
Carmichael, Esq.